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I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, Texas courts amplified the importance of
carefully drafting and structuring joint venture relationships. Specifically,
Texas courts continued to generally show deference to juries’ finding of
partnership formation, even if the basis for the formation of the partner-
ship is merely the actions and words of the parties. Another broad theme
of the cases from this survey period was the importance of careful plead-
ings over the course of an adjudication, as many of the outcomes during
the survey period hinged on such procedural actions. This article is di-
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vided into five main sections that review cases covering the following top-
ics: (I) partnership formation; (II) breach of partners’ duties, including
fiduciary and disclosure duties; (III) personal liability of members or
managers under veil-piercing principles; (IV) derivative claims; and (V)
creditors’ remedies against a partner.
II. FORMATION OF PARTNERSHIP
A. DE FACTO PARTNERSHIP FORMATION
In In re Hernandez,1 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas illustrated the circumstances in which a de facto partnership
is formed.
Jorge Quiroz Hernandez (Hernandez) and Alejandro Quiroz-Pedrazzi
(AQP) owned and operated three frozen yogurt stores in Mexico from
2009 to 2014.2 Hoping to expand into the United States, Hernandez and
AQP formed three Texas limited liability companies: (1) Global Q Invest-
ments, LLC (Global Q); (2) San Antonio Orange Cup, LLC (SA Orange
Cup); and (3) Grupo 2+2, LLC (Grupo). By October 2011, Global Q and
SA Orange Cup had both entered into leases for store locations in the
United States.3
Magdalena Lopez (Lopez) met Hernandez in May 2012 and began dis-
cussing the possibility of Lopez investing in the Orange Cup stores.4 Lo-
pez requested financial information on Global Q and SA Orange Cup
but, without receiving all the requested information, signed a subscription
agreement (the Subscription Agreement) committing Lopez to purchase
20% of Global Q for $400,000.5 The Subscription Agreement provided
that Lopez would lend $200,000 to Global Q with the option to contribute
the loan receivable to Global Q as a portion of her total commitment,
paying the remaining $200,000 in cash.6 After signing the Subscription
Agreement, Lopez loaned Global Q $200,000 in exchange for a promis-
sory note. Both Grupo, a shell company formed by Hernandez to hold his
interest in Global Q, and Hernandez, individually, guaranteed the repay-
ment of the note.7
For the next year, Lopez, Hernandez, and AQP held company meet-
ings, making decisions about the business, including the opening of three
stores.8 Lopez continued to request financial information, which Her-
1. 565 B.R. 367 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2017).
2. Id. at 372. The three stores each faced different challenges during this time period.
One store in Monterrey, Mexico, was only open for part of 2010 due to high crime in the
area. Another store was only open from 2009 to 2014. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 373.
5. Id. The financial information was intended to be attached to the Subscription
Agreement. Although disputed, the court determined that it was not attached to the Sub-
scription Agreement at the time of execution. Id. The Subscription Agreement was coun-
tersigned by Hernandez, individually and on behalf of Grupo, and AQP. Id.
6. Id. at 374.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 374–75.
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nandez failed to provide.9 Even though Lopez did not receive any reports
or cash flow statements, she continued to fund loans documented by
promissory notes and cash calls totaling $671,270.00.10 The stores never
turned a profit and were all shuttered by June 2013.11
Without first demanding repayment of the promissory notes, Lopez
filed suit against Hernandez, AQP, Grupo, and Global Q in Texas state
court and alleged numerous causes of action under state law.12 Her-
nandez filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in January 2015.13 In January 2016,
Lopez and the defendants agreed to remove her suit to the bankruptcy
court.14
Hernandez alleged that he did not owe anything as a borrower to Lo-
pez because Lopez was Hernandez’s partner, not his lender, as evidenced
by their conversations and course of conduct, even though there was no
written joint venture agreement between Lopez and Hernandez or any of
Hernandez’s entities. Despite Lopez never becoming a member of Global
Q, the court found that Lopez, Hernandez, and AQP “unwittingly formed
a partnership by going into business together.”15 In Texas, regardless of
whether the parties intend to or not, “an association of two or more per-
sons to carry on a business for profit as owners creates a partnership.”16
The Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC) contains a five-factor
test to determine whether a partnership has been formed:
(1) receipt or right to receive a share of the profits of the business;
(2) expression of an intent to be partners in the business; (3) partici-
pation or right to participate in control of the business; (4) agree-
ment to share or sharing: (A) losses of the business or (B) liability
for claims by third parties against the business; and (5) agreement to
contribute or contributing money or property to the business.17
The bankruptcy court noted that Texas courts apply the test using the
totality of the circumstances.18 The court found that the circumstances of
this arrangement satisfied four of the five factors: (1) Lopez and Her-
nandez intended to share profits, evidenced by Lopez continuing to fund
Global Q with the belief that she would eventually profit from it; (2) Lo-
9. Id. at 375. Hernandez was unable to provide the financial information, in part,
because he had not paid his accounting firm and could not access the documents that the
accounting firm held. Id.
10. Id. at 374.
11. Id. at 375.
12. Id. Lopez filed suit on May 6, 2014. Lopez alleged, among other things, “breach of
contract, common law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, statutory fraud, negligent misrepre-
sentation, theft under the Theft Liability Act, violation of the Texas Securities Act, promis-
sory estoppel as a claim, unjust enrichment, quantum merit, money had and received,
conversion, vicarious liability by piercing the corporate veil, conspiracy, declaratory judg-
ment action, and accounting.” Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 377.
16. Id. at 377–78 (quoting TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051).
17. Id. at 378 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §152.052(a)).
18. Id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009)).
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pez intended to become a partner in the business by signing the Subscrip-
tion Agreement and by referring to the arrangement as “our
partnership”; (3) Lopez participated in the control of the business by at-
tending meetings with Hernandez and AQP to discuss and make business
decisions; and (4) Lopez agreed to contribute money to the partnership
by making seven deposits to the partnership totaling over $671,270.00.19
In re Hernandez is a compelling example of why entities and individu-
als need to be circumspect in using the terms “partners” and “partner-
ship” with respect to any business relationship—no matter how casually
such terms are intended. In this case, the use of these terms by Lopez was
her death knell when determining the issue of whether a partnership had
been formed. The bankruptcy court relied heavily on the use of the word
“partners,” attending meetings, and depositing money created a “de
facto” partnership. Ultimately, when the business venture failed, Lopez
suffered the consequences of implying a partnership had been formed.20
B. CREATION OF PARTNERSHIP BY ORAL AGREEMENT
Using the five-factor test outlined in Section 152.052 of the TBOC, in
Thunder Rose Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirk, the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals upheld a jury’s finding that a partnership existed by oral agreement,
despite the parties never entering into a written agreement.21
In 2007, Michael Palmer (Palmer) patented a unique valve that he in-
vented to be used in the oil and gas industry; Palmer assigned the patent
rights to the valve to Thunder Rose Enterprises, Inc. (Thunder Rose), a
company co-owned by his daughters.22 Thunder Rose, in preparation for
marketing of the valve, applied for trademarks for “Bullhead,” “Bullhead
Control Systems,” and “Box Carrier.”23 In 2008, Palmer and Billy Kirk
(Kirk) met to discuss financing the testing and marketing of the valve.24
In 2009, Palmer, Kirk, and Kirk’s associate Dickie McGee (McGee) (with
whom Kirk owned Thrubore Valves LLC (Thrubore)) met with Paul
Wang (Wang), who operated Centermart, a Chinese manufacturer.25 At
that meeting, (1) Wang, Kirk, and McGee executed a non-disclosure
agreement, which stated in part that nothing contained within such agree-
ment created a partnership; and (2) Kirk and Palmer agreed that
Centermart would build a steel prototype of the valve at Thurbore’s ex-
pense.26 A month later, Kirk created a bank account for “Excalibur” that
19. Id.
20. The consequences of forming a partnership cost Lopez a great deal of money
($600,000.00, her partnership contribution) which was considered a dischargeable debt in
bankruptcy. See Section III infra for a discussion of the duties Hernandez owed to Lopez
as partners.
21. Thunder Rose Enters., Inc. v. Kirk, No. 13-15-00431-CV, 2017 WL 2172468 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 20, 2017, pet. denied).
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included each of Kirk, Palmer, and McGee as authorized signatories.27
Kirk used the account to pay Palmer’s attorney for patent work, among
other expenses for the prototype’s development.28
That same year, McGee and Kirk prepared a draft agreement for Ex-
calibur, which was never executed, that stated “the parties did not intend
to form a partnership or joint venture.”29 The draft agreement contem-
plated that Palmer would assign the patent rights and both McGee and
Kirk would contribute $100,000 to Excalibur.30 Thunder Rose and Palmer
proposed that Excalibur was to be jointly owned by Thrubore and Thun-
der Rose, with Thrubore contributing $5 million to Excalibur.31
In February 2010, the valve was delivered to Kirk and, even though it
tested well in a machine shop, Palmer objected to certain changes to the
design, claiming that such changes made the valve less safe.32 In May,
Kirk ordered another prototype from Douson, a different Chinese manu-
facturer.33 A few months later, Palmer traveled to China to take part in
the prototype’s testing and began modifying the design for safety and op-
erational reasons.34
In September 2010 and June 2011, Kirk instructed his attorney to draft
the fundamentals of a license agreement to be entered into by Thunder
Rose and Kirk and a draft limited liability company agreement for Bull-
head Control Systems, LLC.35 The parties dispute that either of these
documents contain negotiated provisions; neither were executed.36 In
September 2011, Kirk received from Palmer’s attorney a cease and desist
letter insisting that Kirk end all activity in connection with the valve and
“Bullhead.”37 Kirk filed suit that same month, alleging that he and
Palmer formed a partnership and that Palmer breached his duty of loyalty
to Kirk.38
At trial, the jury found that Kirk and Palmer orally entered into a part-
nership and that such oral partnership agreement contained the following
terms: (1) Kirk would supply the capital to develop and produce the
valve; (2) profits and losses were to be split evenly between Kirk and
Palmer; and (3) Kirk was to receive an exclusive license to market and





31. Id. at *2. Clearly, the parties were on different pages regarding the economics of
the arrangement. However, Kirk and McGee did apply for a $2 million loan from Wells







38. Id. at *3.
39. Id.
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parties to perform under the partnership agreement.40
The appellants, Thunder Rose and Palmer, contended that: (1) there
was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of a partnership;
and (2) the statute of frauds prevents the formation of the alleged
partnership.41
The court of appeals stated that the determination of whether a part-
nership has been formed is governed by the TBOC, specifically the five-
factor formation test considered in the totality of the circumstances.42 In
making its determination, the court relied on Kirk’s testimony during
trial, in which he stated that he and Palmer had “agreed on the agree-
ment, shook hands” that they would split profits and losses evenly, with
Kirk providing funding and overseeing manufacturing of the valve, while
Palmer would give Kirk the exclusive rights to the valve and serve as
technician.43 Further, Kirk’s attorney’s testified that Palmer and Kirk
“held each other out as partners” and “had equal control of the busi-
ness.”44 The court of appeals ultimately found this testimony, along with
emails showing the same and the expenditure of funds by both parties to
develop the valve, as evidence that Palmer and Kirk: (1) both intended to
share profits and losses45; (2) participate in controlling the business46; and
(3) contribute money and property to the business.47 By satisfying these
factors, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence of partnership
formation.48
Additionally, that Palmer expressly held Kirk out as his partner in
emails to third parties (which reiterates the danger of casually using
“partner” and “partnership” terminology) justified the finding of partner-
ship formation.49 While simply calling a person “partner” is not alone
sufficient to establish a partnership, taken into consideration with the ac-
tions of the parties, certainly signals the intent of the parties.50 Further,
the court of appeals noted that even though the parties did not execute a
formal agreement, that is not conclusive evidence that they did not orally
40. Id. at *4.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *5 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a)); see also supra Section
II.A.
43. Thunder Rose Enters., Inc., 2017 WL 2172468, at *5.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Id. Sharing in profits satisfies the first factor of the five-factor test; intent to be in
business together is the second factor; sharing in the losses of the business satisfies factor
four. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a) (West 2006).
46. This finding satisfies the third factor. Thunder Rose Enters., Inc., 2017 WL
2172468, at *5; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a) (West 2006).
47. Thunder Rose Enters., Inc., 2017 WL 2172468, at *6. Kirk contributed over
$400,000.00 to developing the valve. Palmer had expended his own funds throughout the
development process. Id.
48. Id. at *7.
49. Id. at *6. Likely damning, Palmer referred to himself as Kirk’s “favorite partner”
in an email. Id.
50. Id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 900 (Tex. 2009)).
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agree to partner up.51
The appellants’ second argument was that formation of a partnership
by oral agreement is precluded by the statute of frauds.52 The statute of
frauds requires certain agreements to be written and signed to be en-
forceable.53 The appellants’ statute of frauds argument focused on the
time to perform the contract, relying on the statute’s prohibition of “oral
contracts that cannot be completed within one year.”54 The court of ap-
peals noted, however, that “a contract that could possibly be performed
within a year, however improbable performance within one year may be,
does not fall within the statute of frauds.”55 Appellants pointed to the
length of a patent term, twenty years from the date of application filing,
as evidence that the agreement to develop and sell the valve could not be
completed within one year.56 The court of appeals rejected this assertion,
finding nothing in the record to indicate that the parties intended for the
license to last for the entire patent term, and instead pointing to feasibil-
ity of completion of each element of the agreement (assigning the patent,
granting the license, and funding) within one year.57
This case emphasizes the need for partners to clearly outline the rela-
tionship between the participants. Texas juries have found that a partner-
ship has been formed on numerous occasions based on an oral agreement
that takes into account the expectations, conversations, and emails of the
participants. Such jury findings are difficult to overcome on appeal, so
business participants should commit to formal agreements that memorial-
ize the intent and obligations of the parties.
51. Id. at *7. The appellants argued that the draft agreement and the NDA stated that
no partnership was being formed. The court stated, “to the extent this evidence supports a
finding that no partnership was intended, the jury was entitled to reject it.” Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Appellants also asserted that three statutory provisions precluded the forma-
tion of a partnership. Id. at *8. First, appellants argued that, in order to be effective, trade-
mark and patent assignments must be in writing. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1060(a)(3)). The
court of appeals rejected this argument as inapplicable, since the issue was whether the
partnership was formed, not whether the intellectual property rights had been assigned. Id.
The court acknowledged that the agreement contemplated Palmer’s conveyance of a li-
cense to the partnership but noted that “patent licenses are not subject to the statute of
frauds.” Id. Second, appellants argued that Section 101.151 of the TBOC provides that a
promise to contribute property to a company is only enforceable if in writing and executed
by the promisor. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.151). Again, the court of
appeals rejected this statute as inapplicable because, under the oral partnership agreement,
neither party promised to contribute property to the company—Palmer was obligated to
convey a license, not the intellectual property itself to the company. Id.
54. Id. (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982)).
55. Id. (citing Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)).
56. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2015).
57. Thunder Rose Enters., Inc., 2017 WL 2172468, at *7.
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III. DUTIES OWED BY PARTNER
A. PLAINTIFF’S DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
In Tho Q. Pham v. Carrier, the Amarillo Court of Appeals declined to
impose fiduciary duties on two limited liability company members who
caused the company to transfer an asset of the company to another entity
without the knowledge of the other member.58 In 2002, Tho Q. Pham
(Pham), Jason Bryan Carrier (Carrier), and Stephen Bradley Womack
(Womack) were members of Austin Barfish, LLC (Barfish).59 Barfish
owned a bar on Sixth Street in Austin, Texas.60 Carrier and Womack col-
lectively owned 60% of the interests in Barfish, and Pham owned the
remaining 40% of Barfish.61 In both 2002 and 2003, Pham received distri-
butions from Barfish, but in 2004, Pham moved away from Austin and did
not communicate with either Carrier or Womack until 2011.62 Prior to
leaving Austin, Pham asked Carrier and Womack not to transfer or other-
wise distribute Pham’s share of the profits in Barfish.63 Pham brought suit
in 2013 after he discovered that Carrier and Womack had caused Barfish
to transfer ownership in the bar to another limited liability company,
which was formed and owned by Carrier and Womack to the exclusion of
Pham.64
After noting that a party to a contract is not, in general, bound by a
fiduciary duty to the other parties to the same contract, the court of ap-
peals found that, in the context of such a contractual relationship, each
party must exercise due diligence in maintaining its relationship with the
other parties to protect its interests.65 A party will only recover damages
for inherently undiscoverable injuries or in connection with breaches that
were not discoverable through the exercise of reasonable due diligence.66
Here, because Pham failed to demonstrate that he had adequately acted
upon this due diligence requirement regarding Barfish, and his relation-
ship with Carrier and Womack, Pham was unable to persuade the court of
appeals that the type of injury Pham suffered at the hands of Carrier and
Womack was inherently undiscoverable.67
From all appearances, the court of appeals seemingly presumed that
Pham admitted that Carrier and Womack did not owe Pham fiduciary
duties individually since Pham acknowledged the trial court’s prior ruling
58. Tho Q. Pham v. Carrier, No. 07-15-00031-CV, 2017 WL 1291660, at *1 (Tex.







65. Id. at *5.
66. Id. (quoting HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886–87 (Tex. 1998)).
67. Id. This finding was in spite of the fact that there was limited public evidence of the
sale of Barfish and that Pham had not been involved in the day-to-day operation and man-
agement of the bar.
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on this matter.68 Quite interestingly, and despite the fact that an appeals
court reviews a summary judgment de novo,69 the court of appeals did
not directly address the trial court’s finding of an absence of fiduciary
duties nor the meaning of Pham’s simple acknowledgment that the trial
court had ruled on this matter.70 This is noteworthy because the existence
or the nonexistence of a fiduciary duty would likely have impacted the
outcome of this case. Moreover, the court of appeals did not look to the
terms of the agreement governing Barfish, which is in contrast to the em-
phasis typically placed on the terms of partnership governing documents
in other Texas partnership law cases involving fiduciary duties.
B. BREACH OF DUTY IN BANKRUPTCY: NON-DISCHARGEABLE DEBTS
In In re Hernandez, discussed above, the bankruptcy court found that
Lopez and Hernandez had formed a de facto partnership.71 The court
also illustrated the instances in which a partner of a de facto partnership
owed a duty of full disclosure to the other parties, and that the debt stem-
ming from a breach of such duty is nondischargeable in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.72 The question of whether a breach of fiduciary duty is
dischargeable in bankruptcy is a question of federal law; however, state
law determines whether a duty exists.73 In the partnership context, Texas
courts have found that partners owe each other a duty of candor and full
disclosure.74
The TBOC outlines that the partners owe the other partners in the
partnership a duty of loyalty and care; the partner must carry out those
duties in good faith.75 The duty of loyalty includes the “duty to account to
the partnership for property and profits.”76 Partners also owe each other
a duty of full disclosure concerning partnership interests.77 In this case,
Hernandez had a duty to provide financial documents to Lopez upon re-
quest.78 A breach of this fiduciary relationship triggers liability for such
breach under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(4).79
In a bankruptcy proceeding, a debt incurred “for fraud or defalcation
68. Id. at *4 n.6.
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at *4 n.6. The court of appeals appears to equate Pham’s acknowledgement of
the trial court’s dismissal of Pham’s breach of fiduciary duty claim with an admittance by
Pham of the fact (or legal principle) that Carrier and Womack did not owe Pham a fiduci-
ary duty in connection with Barfish.
71. See supra Section II.
72. In re Hernandez, 565 B.R. 367, 378–79 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2017).
73. Id. at 379 (citing Gupta v. E. Idaho Tumor Inst., Inc. (In re Gupta), 394 F.3d 347,
349–50 (5th Cir. 2004)).
74. Id. (citing Hawthorne v. Guenther, 917 S.W.2d 924, 934 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
1996, writ denied)).
75. Id. at 379 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.204 (West 2015)).
76. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.205).
77. Id. (citing Hawthorne, 917 S.W.2d at 934).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 378 (citing Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 186 (5th Cir.
1997)).
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while acting in a fiduciary capacity” is a non-dischargeable debt.80 Defal-
cation is a willful breach of fiduciary duty.81 Willfulness is a measurement
of recklessness, evaluated by “what a reasonable person in the debtor’s
position knew or reasonably should have known.”82 The bankruptcy
court found that under Texas law, Hernandez owed a duty of full disclo-
sure to Lopez, and his breach of that duty amounted to “defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity” when he did not provide the requested
financial information in a reasonable period of time.83 As a result, the
money Lopez loaned or contributed to the partnership after Lopez’s sec-
ond request for financial information that was not satisfied by Hernandez
is a non-dischargeable debt.84
IV. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF A MANAGING MEMBER
In Chico Auto Parts & Service, Inc., v. Crockett, the El Paso Court of
Appeals opined on the personal liability of a member of a limited liability
company.85 Chico Auto Parts & Service, Inc. (Chico) appealed an order
granting summary judgment to the defendants, Black Strata, a limited lia-
bility company, and Craig Crockett (Crockett).86 Chico provides
remediation services for hazardous materials.87 Crockett was the manag-
ing member of Black Strata, and operated an oil well in Tarrant County
(the Well), upon which Chico performed remediation services.88 At the
time the services were provided, Crockett was also the president and
CEO of Montcrest Energy Inc. (Montcrest) and a part-owner in the oil
and gas interests of the Well.89 Montcrest was also a part-owner of the
Well’s oil and gas interests.90
The parties disputed with whom Chico contracted for its services.91
Chico sent an invoice for $63,415.55 to Montcrest; a few months later,
Black Strata sent Chico two checks for $10,000.00 each.92 Chico did not
receive any further payment on the invoice and sued Montcrest for the
balance under breach of contract and quantum meruit theories.93 The
trial court entered an agreed judgment for $43,415.55 plus attorneys’
80. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2018).





85. Chico Auto Parts & Serv., Inc. v. Crockett, 512 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2017, pet. denied).
86. Id. at 565–66. The owner of the land on which the well sits was also a defendant in
this case. Id.
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fees.94 However, Montcrest filed for bankruptcy soon thereafter, without
making any payments under the judgment.95
Chico appealed to place liability on Crockett as managing member of
Black Strata.96 The court explained that the fundamental principle of cor-
porate law—that a “corporation is a separate legal entity from its share-
holders, officers, and directors”—applied to this case.97 However, in the
event a “corporate affiliate”98 uses a corporate form as an “unfair device
to achieve an inequitable result,” courts have found it just to ignore the
corporate structure and apply the common law principle known as “veil-
piercing.”99 In Texas, the most frequently used basis for piercing the cor-
porate veil is the “alter ego theory,” which requires a plaintiff to prove
that the officer of the corporation used the entity for personal purposes
disregarding corporate formalities.100 In July 2011, when Chico per-
formed its services, there were two statutes in effect that limited the in-
stances in which a managing member could be personally liable.101 The
court of appeals pointed to the long line of Texas courts that did not view
such statutes as a complete block to personal liability of limited liability
company members, finding that the common law principles for piercing
the veil that applied to corporations also applied to limited liability
companies.102
The court of appeals noted that in pursuit of piercing the corporate
veil, the plaintiff has the burden of proof, including the burden to affirm-
atively plead all elements of a claim or the failure to do so results in the
waiver of such claims.103 Here, Chico simply failed to assert any allega-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 567, 570. Chico essentially brought the same case it brought against Mont-
crest against a new slate of defendants including Black Strata, Crocket, and the fee simple
and a royalty interest owner of the land. The court noted that if there were a contract, it
“was with Black Strata, and that if Crockett negotiated the contract, it was in his individual
capacity as the managing member of Black Strata, rather than in his capacity as a Well
owner.” Id.
97. Id. at 570 (citing TransPecos Banks v. Strobach, 487 S.W.3d 722, 728 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2016, no pet.)).
98. Id. at 570–71. A “corporate affiliate” is a collective reference to a corporation’s
shareholders, owners, directors, or other affiliates. Id. (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721
S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 571 (citing TransPecos, 487 S.W.3d at 728–29).
101. Id. (referencing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (West 2012) (which pro-
vides “a member or manager is not liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of a limited
liability company” unless the company agreement specifically provides otherwise); TEX.
BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.113 (West 2012) (which provides “a member of a limited
liability company may be named as a party in an action by or against the limited liability
company only if the action is brought to enforce the member’s right against or liability to
the company”)). Effective September 1, 2011, the Texas legislature eliminated the alter ego
theory by adopting § 21.223 of the TBOC, which provides that only if actual fraud is com-
mitted for the corporate affiliate’s personal benefit, then the court may pierce the corpo-
rate veil and impose personal liability on a member of a limited liability company. TEX.
BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(3).
102. Chico Auto Parts & Serv., 512 S.W.3d at 571.
103. Id.
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tions in its pleadings that it intended to pursue Crockett for individual
liability under an alter-ego theory.104 Because Chico failed to affirma-
tively assert any argument or evidence that Crockett should be held liable
as an individual, the court of appeals found that Chico had waived this
claim.105
Although in this case the pleadings were insufficient for the court of
appeals to pierce the corporate veil, this case underscores the importance
of clarifying with whom a contract is with, particularly when dealing with
individuals that may be acting as agents of a limited liability company or
partnership. It is equally important for agents acting on behalf of limited
liability companies and partnerships to document the transaction and to
be consistent and clear regarding the capacity in which they are acting in
interactions with third parties to avoid personal liability.
V. DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
Guerrero-McDonald v. Nassour, from the Eastland Court of Appeals,
reviews and expounds upon Texas case law regarding the ability of a lim-
ited partner to bring derivative claims against a partnership.106 In its
opinion, the court of appeals traced the development of Texas case law on
derivative claims from the corporate context to the partnership con-
text.107 After this survey, the court of appeals denied several of Mary
Guerrero-McDonald’s (GMD) requested claims for derivative relief,
while upholding several of GMD’s other derivative claims as valid since
GMD was “personally aggrieved”108 by those claims.
Texas case law provides that a limited partner has standing to sue if
such limited partner is personally affected by the allegedly wrongful ac-
tion109 and such alleged wrongful action does more than diminish the
value of the partnership.110 In particular, a mere diminishment of a lim-
ited partner’s interest is not a cognizable injury that gives rise to a right
by the limited partner to sue.111 Derivative claimants must focus prima-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Guerrero-McDonald v. Nassour, 516 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017,
no pet.). GMD’s claim arises out of an ultimately unsuccessful real estate development
project. This real estate project was for the development of a condominium in downtown
Austin, Texas. After an initial investor died, GMD sought additional investors for the pro-
ject. These investors formed La Vista Partners LP (La Vista). GMD converted her prior
interests in the project into a 35% interest in La Vista. La Vista eventually faltered and,
after being unable to secure construction financing to complete the project, failed. GMD
sued the other partners and the general partner of La Vista (the Appellees) for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court
dismissed all GMD’s claims, except for her fraud claim. The jury returned a verdict on
GMD’s fraud claim in favor of the Appellees. GMD appealed the trial court’s judgment on
her five claims. See generally id. at 202–03.
107. Id. at 203–06.
108. Id. at 205 (quoting In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. 2014)).
109. Id. at 204 (quoting Hall v. Douglas, 380 S.W.3d 860, 872 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
no pet.)).
110. Id. at 205 (quoting Hall, 380 S.W.3d at 873).
111. Id.
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rily on the nature of the alleged injury,112 which turns on whether the
alleged injuries are suffered by the partnership generally or by the limited
partner directly.113 If the injury was personal to the partner, then such
partner typically will have standing to sue.114
Using this framework, the court of appeals analyzed whether GMD’s
alleged injuries impacted her as an individual or whether those injuries
were sustained by the limited partnership generally.115 Among the al-
leged injuries, the court of appeals declined to find that the misuse or
mismanagement of funds of the limited partnership were derivative
claims because those claims impacted the valuation of the limited part-
nership as an entity rather than impacting GMD in her individual
capacity.116
The court of appeals similarly denied GMD standing to assert a deriva-
tive claim for the partnership’s failure to call additional capital contribu-
tions and to invest adequate capital in the operating assets of the
partnership.117 GMD argued that these actions uniquely, and negatively,
impacted the value of her investment in the partnership since her partner-
ship interest was the only interest protected from dilution in the event the
partnership called additional capital contributions to fund the project.118
The court of appeals rejected this claim, reasoning that although GMD’s
contribution to the operations of the partnership was unique and her lim-
ited partnership interest was protected from dilution, the other limited
partners also lost their investment in the partnership on account of inade-
quate funding.119 Thus, GMD was not entitled to bring a derivative claim
because the alleged harm was not exclusive to her.120
In contrast, GMD successfully asserted standing in her claim that the
partnership agreement was breached by the failure of the partnership to
pay her pursuant to her consulting agreement with the partnership.121
The court of appeals found that GMD’s consulting agreement claim was
unique to GMD since no other limited partner had a similar contractual
arrangement with the partnership.122 In overruling the trial court on this
112. Id. (quoting Hall, 380 S.W.3d at 874).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. 2014)).
115. Id. at 207.
116. Id. at 208 (citing Hodges v. Rajpal, 459 S.W.3d 237, 249 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015,
no pet.)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 207.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 209. Interestingly, the Eastland Court of Appeals did not thoroughly evalu-
ate the nature of GMD’s standing and what impact, if any, the nature of this standing
would have upon GMD’s ability to bring her claim. The basis of GMD’s claim is apparently
anchored in a privity of contract theory between GMD and Guerrero-McDonald & Asso-
ciates, Inc. The Eastland Court of Appeals dismisses the necessity of a privity of contract
inquiry in its standing analysis by summarily noting that “whether a party is entitled to sue
on a contract is not truly a standing issue because it does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.” See id. at 208 n.4.
122. Id. at 208.
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issue, the court of appeals found that this claim “diminished the value of
GMD’s interest in the limited partnership exclusively, rather than the
value of the limited partnership generally.”123
This case shows it is essential to properly plead a client’s derivative
claims for relief so as to highlight the direct and exclusive nature of the
injury caused to the client-plaintiff by such a claim.124 If a claim is not
positioned in such a fashion, then a Texas court will likely reject the de-
rivative claim on the grounds that the claimant lacks standing. As with
other areas of the law, a proper framing of a derivative claim within the
broader legal and factual setting out of which such claim emerges is es-
sential to opening the courtroom doors to a claimant.
VI. CREDITOR’S REMEDIES AGAINST A MEMBER
A. TURNOVER ORDER: TEXT OVER POLICY
The First Houston Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas charging order
statute in Pajooh v. Royal West Investments LLC, Series E and deter-
mined that, pursuant to the text of the statute, a charging order is the
exclusive remedy for a judgment creditor to enforce its claim against a
judgment debtor’s interests in a partnership.125 Danesh Pajooh (Pajooh),
a real estate developer and investor, was a 99% limited partner in County
Investment L.P. (County Investment) and held 99% of the interests of
County Investment’s general partner, U.S. Capital Investments LLC
(U.S. Capital Investments)126 Pajooh, U.S. Capital Investments, and
Royal West Investments LLC, Series E (Royal West) entered into a series
of real estate transactions, which eventually soured. Litigation arose
among the parties and resulted in a judgment of $352,380 plus approxi-
mately $165,000 in attorneys’ fees in favor of Royal West.127 Royal West
was largely unsuccessful for two years in collecting on this judgment from
Pajooh and U.S. Capital Investments.128 After this initial period, Royal
West discovered that, although Pajooh directly owned few material assets
that could be used to satisfy the judgment, County Investment owned
property worth approximately four million dollars, which included com-
mercial real estate, a luxury car, antique automobiles, antique rugs, oil
paintings, furniture, and other investments.129
Royal West then obtained a charging order against Pajooh’s member-
ship interest in U.S. Capital Investments, which prohibited U.S. Capital
123. Id. at 209.
124. Id. at 205 (quoting Hall v. Douglas, 380 S.W.3d 860, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005,
no pet.)).
125. Pajooh v. Royal West Inv. LLC, Series E, 518 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
126. Id. at 559. Pajooh’s sister, Jila Mesgarpouran, owned the remaining 1% interest in
U.S. Capital Investments.
127. Id. at 560.
128. Id.
129. Id.
2018] Partnership Law 321
Investments from making any distributions to Pajooh.130 The trial court
also issued a charging order encumbering Pajooh’s and U.S. Capital In-
vestments’ interests in County Investments.131 The trial court later en-
tered an additional order that required turnover of assets in satisfaction
of the judgment debt and placed both Pajooh and U.S. Capital Invest-
ments, the two judgment debtors, under receivership.132 This order gave
the receiver broad power regarding the judgments debtors’ assets, but did
not specifically provide the receiver with any power over the judgment
debtors’ interests in County Investments or Pajooh’s membership interest
in U.S. Capital Investments.133 This order also noted that a charging or-
der is the exclusive means by which a judgment creditor may satisfy its
claim against a judgment debtor’s interests in a partnership.134
Pajooh and U.S. Capital Investments then moved to vacate this turno-
ver and receivership order on the grounds that turnover order against
their membership interests was in conflict with the exclusivity of charging
orders under the TBOC.135 Pajooh and U.S. Capital Investments also
contended that the trial court’s order was improper since there was no
evidence that Pajooh and U.S. Capital Investments owned property that
could not be attached through ordinary legal process.136 During this pe-
riod, Royal West suspected that Pajooh continued receiving distributions
from County Investment in violation of the trial court’s charging order.137
Royal West acted on this suspicion and petitioned the trial court for a
modification of the turnover and receivership order.138
The trial court granted Royal West’s request and issued an amended
order that appointed a receiver over the assets of Pajooh and U.S. Capital
Investments, including their interest in County Investment L.P.139 This
amended order also specifically provided for the receiver to take posses-
sion of all the property and assets of Pajooh and U.S. Capital Invest-
ments, including their bank accounts.140 Pajooh and U.S. Capital
Investments appealed arguing that the trial court was in error because a
charging order was the exclusive remedy pursuant to the TBOC.141
The court of appeals first addressed whether the trial court abused its
discretion in the appointment of a receiver since a charging order is the






135. Id.; see TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 153.256 (West 2012). Pajooh similarly argued that
his membership interest in U.S. Capital Investments should not be subject to a turnover
and receivership order. Pajooh, 518 S.W.3d at 560.





141. Id. at 562.
142. Id.
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policy rationale for the charging order as an exclusive remedy was to limit
disruption to the partnership’s business by a judgment debtor liquidating
a partnership interest in satisfaction of a nonpartnership debt.143 Since a
judgment creditor may not reach the property of the limited partner-
ship,144 a charging order enables the judgment creditor to attach to any
distributions from the partnership that would otherwise go to the judg-
ment debtor.145 A charging order does not, however, permit a judgment
creditor from participating in, or otherwise directly interfering with, the
management and operation of the partnership.146
Royal West, in seeking to rebut the plain text of the charging order
statute, marshaled several policy arguments in support of its position.
Royal West argued that the exclusivity provisions of the TBOC did not
apply because the policy justification for a charging order did not match
the facts of this case.147 Citing a Florida case and a federal bankruptcy
case, Royal West contended that a charging order is intended to protect
non-debtor partners and to prevent a judgment creditor from participat-
ing in the ownership and control of the partnership.148 Royal West argued
that the protective nature of the exclusivity of a charging order was ab-
sent in this case since there were no third-party interests to protect.149
After noting the limited precedential value of cases from jurisdictions
other than Texas, the court of appeals distinguished those cases from the
case before the court on the ground that the holdings of those cases de-
rive from statutory law unlike the Texas charging order statute150 and
pursuant to this finding, ultimately rejected Royal West’s rationale for
deviating from the statute.151
Royal West, citing that the text of the charging order statute referenced
a “judgment creditor of a partner”152 and not a judgment creditor of all
143. Id. (citing Stanley v. Reef Sec., Inc., 314 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010,
no pet.)).
144. Id. at 563 (quoting TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 153.256(f) (West 2012)).
145. Id. at 562–63 (quoting Stanley, 314 S.W.3d at 664).
146. Id. at 563 (quoting Stanley, 314 S.W.3d at 664–65).
147. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 153.256(d) (West 2012)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. In the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court held, “as a matter of Colo-
rado law, that the debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing assigned her membership interest in
the LLC to the bankruptcy estate, transferring to the trustee the right to manage it—in-
cluding the right to liquidate the LLC’s assets.” Id. at 563 n.1 (quoting In re Albright, 291
B.R. 538, 540–41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003)). The court of appeals stated that the Albright
decision “rested on Colorado law that recognized the trustee as the ‘substituted member’
of the LLC, with all the rights of the member who assigned her membership interest to the
bankruptcy estate.” Id. at 563 n.1 (citing Albright, 291 B.R. at 540 & n.5). Rounding out
this argument, the court of appeals went on to find that “there is no analogous Texas stat-
ute that justifies a transfer of control over the limited partnership [interest].” Id. Similarly,
“and in contrast to the Texas statute at issue in this appeal, the Florida statute plainly
provided that a charging order was a nonexclusive remedy as to an LLC.” Id. (citing Olm-
stead v. Fed. Trade Comm., 44 So.3d 76, 81–82 (Fla. 2010)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 564 (quoting TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 153.256(d) (West 2012)) (emphasis
added). Royal West’s argument apparently turns on the notion that Pajooh was not merely
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the partners, also contended that a reference to a “partner” in the TBOC
applied to one or more partners, but fewer than all of the partners, and
not to a circumstance in which all of the partners are jointly liable.153 The
court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that Texas courts should
only utilize the tools of statutory construction when the statute’s language
is unclear or ambiguous.154 Since the court of appeals did not agree that
the specific charging order provisions of the TBOC under consideration
were unclear, it did not believe there was a need to resort to extrinsic aids
to clarify the meaning of the statute.155 As a result, the court of appeals
declined to impose an exception to the Texas charging order statute pur-
suant to Royal West’s textual arguments and concluded that a judgment
creditor’s exclusive remedy against a judgment debtor’s partnership inter-
est is a charging order.156
The court of appeals did, however, suggest that ordering a judgment
debtor to turnover its distribution from a partnership could be proper
pursuant to a turnover and receivership after such distribution has been
made to the judgment debtor,157 even if the turnover order did not specif-
ically identify the property subject to the turnover order.158 On this basis,
the court of appeals held that the turnover and receivership order was a
proper means to monitor distributions from the partnership and enforced
Royal West’s charging order against Pajooh and U.S. Capital Invest-
ments.159 The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s impo-
sition of receiverships on both Pajooh and U.S. Capital Investments,160
but reversed the trial court’s order to the extent the order imposed a
receivership on the membership interests of Pajooh and County Invest-
ment.161 This case draws a carefully delineated analytical distinction be-
tween a turnover and receivership order against a partnership interest
and a turnover and receivership order against distributions received in
connection with a partnership interest. In doing so, the court of appeals
does not conflate the equitable remedies available to Texas courts with
statutorily mandated exclusivity provisions.
B. TURNOVER ORDER: POLICY OVER TEXT
In contrast to Pajooh, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals, in
Gillet v. ZUPT, LLC, declined to reverse a trial court’s determination
“a partner” but was in fact “all the partners”, through his direct and indirect interests, in
County Investment.
153. Id. Royal West’s textual contention was that the same word in different parts of
the same statute should be afforded the same meaning unless a different intent is otherwise
clear.
154. Id. (citing Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 565 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 153.256 (West 2012)).
157. Id. at 566–67.
158. Id. at 566 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002(h) (West 2008)).
159. Id. at 567.
160. Id. at 568.
161. Id.
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that a turnover order could be levied against a member’s interest in a
limited liability company despite the Texas statute’s explicit command
that a charging order is the exclusive remedy for the satisfaction of a
judgment creditor’s claim against a membership interest of a judgment
debtor.162 In 2012, an arbitrator determined that ZUPT, LLC (ZUPT), a
limited liability company, owed Joel Gillet (Gillet), one of its members,
$499,050 pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that required ZUPT to
purchase Gillet’s membership interest in ZUPT.163 The arbitrator further
found that Gillett would transfer his entire ownership interest back to
ZUPT upon payment of $499,050 to Gillett by ZUPT.164 ZUPT then
sought the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s awards, where-
upon the trial court ordered a turnover of Gillet’s membership interest in
ZUPT.165 Gillet appealed the trial court’s turnover order against Gillet’s
interests in ZUPT.166
At the outset of its analysis, the court of appeals noted that a Texas
appellate court is required to affirm a trial court’s turnover order unless
such order is unreasonable or arbitrary.167 As a result, a Texas appeals
court will not reverse a trial court’s turnover order even if such order is
based on an incorrect reading of law.168 Gillet, as the appellant, argued
that a charging order was the only remedy available to ZUPT to satisfy its
claim against Gillet’s interest in ZUPT and that the trial court erred in
ordering a turnover of Gillet’s interest.169 Gillet also contended that, be-
cause a charging order is a lien on the interest of the debtor that may not
be foreclosed, a judgment creditor is only entitled to the receipt of distri-
bution.170 The court of appeals, noting that this question appears to be
one of first impression, quickly turned to policy arguments to overcome
the statute.
The court of appeals outlined that the purpose of a charging order is to
prevent a disruption of a partnership’s business through a forced liquida-
tion of a partnership interest in satisfaction of a judgment creditor’s
claim.171 The policy reasons for exclusively issuing a charging order are
inapplicable in this case, according to the court of appeals, because the
judgment creditor is the entity in which the judgment debtor holds his
interest.172 In other words, the court of appeals tacitly alleges that the
Texas legislature could not have intended to bar a turnover order when
162. Gillet v. ZUPT, LLC, 523 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no
pet.).
163. Id. at 752–53.
164. Id. at 753.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)).
168. Id. at 754 (quoting Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 226).
169. Id. at 757.
170. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 101.112(c) (West 2012)).
171. Id. (citing Stanley v. Reef Sec., Inc., 314 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010,
no pet.)).
172. Id.
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the judgment creditor is the entity seeking to enforce a turnover of an
interest in the judgment creditor—this in spite of the text of the statute.
In holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding
that a charging order was not ZUPT’s exclusive remedy, the court of ap-
peals scaffolded this outcome on the basis of two policy rationales. As
noted above, the first rationale was that the legislative intent underlying
the exclusivity of a charging order is not applicable when a judgment
creditor is the entity seeking to enforce the turnover order.173 Second,
because the facts involved the transfer of the membership interest from
Gillet to ZUPT,174 the business affairs of ZUPT would not be disrupted
as a result of the liquidation of the membership interest in ZUPT.175 In
this circumstance, the court of appeals concluded that a turnover order
was proper.176
VII. CONCLUSION
The cases from this survey period underscore the critical importance of
memorializing the intent of the parties in joint venture agreements. Par-
ties’ interactions and language with one another have proven to be highly
relevant as to partnership classification issues and partnership matters,
even when the relevant written agreements do not appear to be ambigu-
ous. Drafters should also remain attuned to Texas courts’ apparent will-
ingness to entertain policy arguments when interpreting statutory law,
and litigators are advised to follow procedural requirements thoroughly
when prosecuting a Texas partnership law case or controversy on behalf
of a client. As with other years, a counsel’s responsibility to stay abreast
of recent developments in Texas partnership law is crucial for the effec-
tive representation of a client in negotiating and enforcing partnership
agreements.
173. Id. at 758.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 757.
176. Id. at 758.
